Decision-makers in the Biden administration are afraid Israel’s retaliation against Iran will drag the U.S. into a widening conflict in the Middle East. While Israel continues weighing options, the Netanyahu government continues making threats suggesting massive retaliation is on the table.
“Our strike will be powerful, precise and above all — surprising,” Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said. “They will not understand what happened and how it happened.”
Former Middle East Envoy David Satterfield echoed the fears of many in the Biden administration when he told Politico, “What could Israel by itself do without drawing in the United States?”
But fears of entanglement (also referred to as entrapment and chain-ganging) are exaggerated. Great powers such as the U.S. have been able to avoid being dragged into wars over which they only partially share their allies’ interests using several tools. This includes using alliances as tools of management, exploiting loopholes in alliance “contracts” and distancing themselves from war-prone, risk-acceptant clients.
Here’s how the Biden administration may use these tools to avoid a conflict with Iran.
President Biden has said the U.S. would not support Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear installations. However, some, such as the Atlantic Council’s Matthew Kroenig, argue Israel should exploit its “escalation dominance” by striking Iran’s nuclear facilities because Iran has shortened its breakout timeline to one to two weeks, and there does not appear to be any diplomatic solution on the horizon.
Entanglement refers to a state with only a partial interest at stake being drawn into an ally’s fight. It is one of two pathologies in international politics with respect to alliances, the other being buck-passing, whereby states refuse to engage in balancing against a threat in hopes that another power will take up the responsibility.
Biden has broad discretion to prevent Israel from attacking Iran because, without American aid, Israel’s ability to destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities and energy facilities is limited.
Several factors stand in the way of Israel taking out the Iranian nuclear program in the same way it struck Iraq’s in 1981 and Syria’s in 2007. These include the loss of strength gradient, fuel, Iranian air defenses, Israel’s lack of long-range bombers, and the fact that Natanz and Fordow are buried deep underground and therefore difficult to bomb.
The Biden administration’s attempts to limit Israel’s widening of the war — the “hug Bibi strategy” — have thus far largely failed. This does not mean that the U.S. is out of options. To prevent being chain-ganged into a fight with Iran, Biden could use the alliance with Israel as a tool of management.
The U.S. has done this before. During the Cold War, the U.S. exploited loopholes in alliance contracts with Taiwan and South Korea to prevent them from dragging America into a war with China. The U.S.-Israeli alliance is vague, based on commitments made by U.S. presidents starting with John F. Kennedy in 1962. The U.S. has not made a commitment to Israel like NATO’s Article 5.
The U.S. could tell Israel that if it attacks Iran, the U.S. will deny it the kind of military assistance and intelligence it received in fending off Iran’s attack at the beginning of October. The U.S. deployed two Arleigh Burke-class destroyers that launched a dozen interceptors against Iranian missiles.
Biden could apply additional pressure by threatening economic sanctions. This is not unprecedented. It recently sanctioned a dozen Israelis the State Department said had engaged in violence against Palestinians and were an obstacle to peace. During the Suez Crisis, in February 1957, Eisenhower threatened to withhold $100 million in annual aid unless Israel completely pulled out of the Sinai. Within a month, Israel withdrew its forces.
Biden could distance the U.S. from Israel in case of a widening of the war by taking a page out of Saudi Arabia’s handbook and reaching out to Iran. Either publicly or through a third party, the U.S. could inform the Iranians that attacks on American troops and installations are intolerable. However, the U.S. could underscore its distancing itself from Israel by refusing to coordinate troops and fighters with its forces. The U.S. could up the ante by reissuing Gerald Ford’s 1975 threat to reassess the U.S.-Israeli alliance.
Finally, in case of an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear sites, the Biden administration could follow in Ronald Reagan’s footsteps after Osirak.
Reagan had United Nations Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick confer with her Iraqi counterpart in drafting a Security Council resolution condemning the Osirak strike. Should Netanyahu go ahead and attack Iran’s nuclear and oil facilities, the U.S. could draft a similar resolution of condemnation and include Iran by working through a third party, such as Oman.
Critics may say that abandoning Israel in such a manner would damage U.S. credibility with its other allies and embolden American adversaries. However, there is little empirical evidence to support this idea.
In some instances, disloyalty to one reckless ally may be welcomed by other allies. The United States’ Persian Gulf allies may see the withdrawal of military aid and sanctions as prudent measures if it helps shield them from an Iranian or Houthi counterattack.
To prevent U.S. entanglement in an Israeli-Iranian war, the Biden administration could use its influence, through sanctions and denial of military assistance to limit Israeli retaliation. Should hostilities break out, the U.S. could distance itself from Israel by threatening to reassess the relationship and even condemn such an attack in concert with Tehran.
Albert B. Wolf is a global fellow at Habib University.
