In the months since the Israel-Hamas war began in October 2023, China has seized on the conflict to criticize not only Israel but by extension the U.S. and its position in the region.
For years, Chinese diplomats had been careful to toe a centrist line in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, calibrating their language to avoid offending either side too greatly. Yet as the conflict has dragged on the past year, and as the region’s criticisms of the U.S. have risen, Beijing sensed an opportunity to diminish the U.S. standing while boosting its own.
Chinese officials have regularly omitted a mention of Hamas’s atrocities while blasting Israel and the U.S. for its support. In September, a Chinese United Nations representative lambasted the U.S. for “shielding” Israel and called on Washington to take a “responsible attitude” with regard to the conflict, all while painting its own efforts as more reflective of the consensus of a “majority of countries.”
Now, however, the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has presented the U.S. with a similar opportunity. For years, Beijing has consistently sided with Bashar al-Assad in his brutal repression of the opposition. In 2023, Xi Jinping hosted the Syrian leader and his wife in Beijing, pledging deeper ties and a desire to, “jointly safeguard international fairness and justice.”
Beijing’s calculation for support was two-fold.
For one, external interventions in other Arab Spring revolutions like Libya spooked Beijing, which has long insisted on its principles of “non-interference” and “respect for sovereignty.” China consistently vetoed U.N. Security Council resolutions that criticized the regime or ran counter to Russia and the regime’s interests, often invoking those tenets of non-interference as justification.
For another, China’s own domestic security faced a challenge as violent extremist groups came to mark the battleground in Syria. Chinese Uyghurs began flocking to Syria in 2013 to fight and train with other violent extremist groups. Exact figures are hard to come by, but at one point Syrian officials claimed approximately 5,000 Uyghur fighters were in the country. Beijing was long fearful that these fighters may return home and foment unrest.
In the wake of Assad’s ouster, Beijing has scrambled to recalibrate its messaging. A spokesperson for the foreign ministry called for stability and expressed China’s desire that the “future and destiny of Syria should be decided by the Syrian people.” Chinese state media changed its labeling of the Syrian opposition groups as “terrorists” to “opposition armed forces.”
China will undoubtedly try to position itself with whatever governing authority emerges in Syria. Beijing will be able to offer recognition and reconstruction aid, as well as a friendly voice should the emerging new Syrian leadership seek a non-Western voice of support.
Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East has been nothing if not nimble: In 2023, Beijing brokered a diplomatic agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia after years of hostility, and Chinese diplomats have repeatedly tried their hand at intra-Palestinian harmonization. China will not want its increased stature in the region to go to waste. Beijing will seek to create an understanding with whoever emerges in the coming months.
Yet that hill may be a tougher climb than Beijing would hope. Many Syrians rightly blame Russia and Iran for enabling the Assad regime to stay in power all these years. While China was not nearly as involved in Syria as Russia or Iran, it has grown closer to both of those countries in recent years.
Additionally, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine overburdened its economy and military, creating an overreliance on China, Iran and North Korea. Many Syrians may be loath to embrace Beijing too closely, given its ties to Moscow and Tehran. This, too, presents an opportunity for the U.S. and other Western countries to drive a wedge between the new Syrian government and its traditional backers.
The incoming Trump administration has a rare opportunity. Trump may believe that Syria is “not our fight,” but the competition with China is very much ours and will undoubtedly be a focus of his administration. Here, in Syria, is an opportunity for the U.S. to increase its position at the expense of China.
Beijing looks to Middle Eastern countries for validation of its status as a global power. China may not be trying to replace the U.S. in the Middle East, but it is increasing its economic, diplomatic, and security ties in an attempt to court the region’s leaders and public away from the U.S.
For months, U.S. support for Israel has been an arrow in China’s quiver. Now, the U.S. has one of its own.
Grant Rumley is the director of the Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Program on Great Power Competition and the Middle East at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He previously served as an advisor for Middle East Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
